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INTELLIGENCE TESTING AND ATKINS:




In Atkins v. Virginia' the Supreme Court held that the
execution of any individual with mental retardation violates the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment. The holding of Atkins is straightforward: Persons
with mental retardation cannot be subject to the death penalty. In
keeping with its tradition of allowing the lower courts to
determine how new constitutional rules will be implemented,
however, the Atkins Court intentionally gave them little
direction on how to apply that apparently simple, but profoundly
important, prohibition. As the Atkins ruling passes its one-year
anniversary, the decision has in consequence presented a
number of challenges for the legal community, especially for the
appellate courts that will be charged with establishing the
procedures used to give effect to its rule.
For states like Alabama, which currently has no statute
addressing capital defendants with mental retardation and a
legislature that will not reconvene for its regular session until the
spring of 2004, appellate courts are likely to make the initial
* Lauana Davis is a staff attorney at the Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama in
Montgomery, Alabama. EJI is a non-profit organization that provides legal representation
to indigent defendants and prisoners, and as part of that work, provides representation to
prisoners sentenced to death in Alabama. The author thanks Ruth A. Friedman for her
guidance and encouragement, Professor Randy Hertz, Director of Clinical and Advocacy
Programs, New York University School of Law, for his tremendous assistance in
organizing this topic, and J. Drew Colfax for his comments and generous help with access
to research.
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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determinations about Atkins and its implications. However,
determining mental retardation will require appellate courts to
undertake a more complicated analysis than that required by
cases like Thompson v. Oklahoma2 and Coker v. Georgia,' which
addressed other Eighth-Amendment concerns. This Article
explores some of the considerations and challenges that
appellate courts and the lawyers that practice before them will
face in undertaking the complicated analysis that Atkins
requires: What are the constitutional limits on defining mental
retardation, how can the legal system avoid the pitfalls inherent
in seeking a definitive answer to a fluid concept such as
intelligence, and how does the history of mental retardation
inform the appellate courts' assessment of mental retardation?
The Atkins Court extended the exemption from execution to
all capital defendants who "fall within the range of mentally
retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus,
' 4
effectively reminding courts that the states cannot create laws to
deprive mentally retarded defendants of an exemption
guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment; whatever procedures
they use to define and prove mental retardation, those
procedures must satisfy the Constitution
However, because the Constitution "'places a substantive
restriction on the state's power to take the life' of a mentally
retarded offender," 6 the Eighth Amendment also restricts states'
ability to stray from the accepted mental-retardation definitions
or to establish procedures that restrict advocates' abilities to
present evidence of mental retardation. If states deviate
2. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (holding that the imposition of the death penalty on persons
fifteen years of age or younger violates the Eighth Amendment).
3. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (prohibiting death penalty for rape as excessive punishment
under the Eighth Amendment).
4. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
5. There will be undoubtedly be decisionmakers unhappy with the decision in Atkins
who will be tempted to make both definitions of mental retardation and the procedures
required to prove an Atkins claim more restrictive. In Alabama, for example, a post-Atkins
bill proposed that the IQ cutoff be established at "below 70," even though the prevalent
clinical definitions of mental retardation include an IQ of 70 within the range of mental
retardation. Ala. H. 340, 2003 Reg. Sess. at 2 (Mar. 11, 2003) (proposing the establishment
of procedures in death penalty cases to determine whether a defendant is mentally
retarded); see also Ala. Sen. 323, 2003 Reg. Sess. (Mar. 18, 2003) (proposing to establish
an exemption from capital punishment for defendants with mental retardation).
6. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
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significantly from national standards of defining mental
retardation, they risk higher courts' concluding that their
definitions are outside the national consensus.
II. IQ SCORES AND MENTAL RETARDATION
In fashioning a legal definition of mental retardation, the
Atkins Court recognized that state statutory definitions generally
conform to the clinical definitions set forth by the American
Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) and the American
Psychiatric Association (APA), the two leading organizations
that set definitions and standards for determining mental
retardation. The three core components of these definitions are
(1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (2)
that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive
functioning in at least two of the following skill areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal
skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional
academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety, and (3) onset
of the condition prior to 18 years of age.7 Intellectual functioning
is weighed equally with adaptive behavior in determining mental
retardation.8
The APA describes the "significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning" associated with an IQ in the range that
includes a score of 70 as "approximately two standard
deviations below the mean [score of 100]." ' In accordance with
that definition, the Atkins Court identified an IQ between 70 and
75 or lower as "significantly subaverage general intellectual
functioning." '0 The Court noted that only an estimated one to
three percent of the population would have an IQ score at 70 or
below. "
7. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n. 3 (setting out AAMR definition).
8. Am. Assn. on Mental Retardation, Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification,
and Systems of Supports 80 (10th ed., Am. Assn. on Mental Retardation 2002) [hereinafter
Mental Retardation].
9. Am. Psych. Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-Text
Revision (4th ed., Am. Psych. Press 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
10. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n. 5 (setting out APA definition).
11. Id.
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In the past, persons within this range would have been
categorized as having "mild" mental retardation, but the "mild"
label is being reconsidered in the psychological community
today. In 1992, the AAMR dropped the terms classifying
persons with mental retardation by levels of severity (profound,
severe, moderate, and mild) from its definition. The AAMR
cited two major reasons for this move: that the "mild"
designation was based only on IQ while an assessment of mental
retardation must include adaptive functioning, and that the term
"mild" was at times a misnomer for "a condition that represents
a considerable disadvantage." 12 However, levels of severity are
still used in the current version of the DSM-IV. 3
In the summer of 2002, after Atkins was decided, the
AAMR announced a new definition of mental retardation:
"Mental retardation is a disability characterized by significant
limitations both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive
behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical
adaptive skills. This disability originates before age 18." '4 While
statutory definitions of mental retardation may continue to
reflect that cited in Atkins, then, appellate courts and appellate
attorneys should be aware that psychologists and other mental
health professionals may use the updated definition.
Both of the most accepted clinical definitions of mental
retardation cited in Atkins place the IQ cutoff for mental
retardation between 70 and 75." Although the Court did not
mandate that states use a particular definition of mental
retardation, the states that have definitions of mental retardation
prohibiting imposition of capital punishment generally fall
within that outlined in Atkins: Arkansas, 6 Arizona, 7 Colorado,'8
Connecticut,' 9  Delaware, °  Florida,2' Georgia,22  Idaho,23
12. Mental Retardation, supra n. 8, at 26.
13. DSM-IV-TR, supra n. 9, at 42.
14. Mental Retardation, supra n. 8, at 1.
15. 536 U.S. at 308 n. 3.
16. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618 (LEXIS 2003).
17. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703.02 (LEXIS 2003)
18. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-1101 (LEXIS 2003).
19. Conn. Gen. Stat. § I-Ig (LEXIS 2003).
20. Del. Code Ann. tit. II § 4209 (as amended by 74 Del. Laws 174) (LEXIS 2003).
21. Fla. Stat. § 921.137 (LEXIS 2003).
22. Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-131 (LEXIS 2003).
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Indiana,24, Kansas,25  Kentucky," Louisiana,27  Maryland,
Missouri,29 Nebraska,3° Nevada,3 New Mexico,32 New York,33
34 36 73North Carolina, South Dakota,35 Tennessee," Utah,37 Virginia,' s
and Washington 9 are all in this category. Arkansas's statute has
a rebuttable presumption of mental retardation when there is an
40I.Q. score of 65 or below. South Dakota employs a
presumption that a capital defendant with an IQ over 70 is
presumed not to meet the definition of "significant subaverage
general intellectual functioning.",4' The remaining states that
have capital punishment statutes but have not yet enacted
statutes exempting persons with mental retardation from the
death penalty (as of September 2003) are Alabama, California,
Illinois,42 Iowa, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, and
Wyoming. 3
Despite some state legislative efforts to nail down a
definitive IQ score to define subaverage intellectual functioning,
the psychological community recommends a more flexible
23. Idaho Code § 19-2515A (LEXIS 2003).
24. Ind. Code § 35-36-9-2 (LEXIS 2003).
25. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4623 (LEXIS 2003).
26. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 532.130 (LEXIS 2003).
27. 2003 La. Acts 698 (LEXIS 2003).
28. Md. Crim. L. Code Ann. § 2-202 (LEXIS 2003).
29. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.030 (LEXIS 2003).
30. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105.01 (LEXIS 2003).
31. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 174.1 (as amended by 2003 Nev. Stat. 137) (LEXIS 2003).
32. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20A-2.1 (LEXIS 2003).
33. N.Y. Crim. P. L. § 400.27(1) (LEXIS 2003).
34. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-2005 (LEXIS 2003).
35. S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-26.3 (LEXIS 2003).
36. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203 (LEXIS 2003).
37. Utah Code Ann. § 77-15a-101-102 (LEXIS 2003).
38. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (LEXIS 2003).
39. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.030 (LEXIS 2003).
40. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618 (LEXIS 2003).
41. S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-26.3 (LEXIS 2003).
42. Bills addressing Atkins were introduced in the Illinois legislature but were not
enacted into law. See 111. H. 104, 93d Gen. Assembly (Jan. 8, 2003); I11. H. 3218, 93rd Gen.
Assembly (Feb. 27, 2003); Ill. H. 3369, 93d Gen. Assembly (Feb. 28, 2003).
43. Legislative developments in these states bear watching. Lawyers and judges who
are likely to be involved in capital appeals and post-conviction proceedings should follow
the activities of their state legislatures.
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approach. Clinical psychology takes into account a standard
error of measurement of plus or minus five for an IQ score on a
standardized IQ test.44 Thus clinical measurement of IQ scores is
properly viewed as within a range, rather than as a rigid single
number.45 The DSM-IV-TR requires that any intelligence test
used to measure intellectual functioning must be "standardized"
and "individually administered., 46 IQ tests that are given in
groups, therefore, are considered unreliable to establish a valid
IQ score.
The AAMR cautions that determinations of mental
retardation cannot be based solely on the results of an IQ test.47
While a bright-line IQ score cutoff may appear to be a neat and
quick solution for appellate courts facing these difficult cases,
the Supreme Court has indicated that wholesale rejection of
Atkins claims is inappropriate when the decisions are based
solely on defendants' IQ scores. In fact, in the wake of Atkins,
the Court remanded several cases in which the defendants'
reported IQ scores were above 75.48
Psychology's definition of mental retardation has been the
foundation of the corresponding legal definitions. However, the
definition of mental retardation will continue to change within
the psychological community and may leave some states with
outdated statutory definitions of mental retardation that may be
no longer relevant to advancing psychological measurements.
Although states with outdated definitions of mental retardation
could alter their statutes to comport with new mental retardation
definitions, given the difficulty of passing new bills in the state
legislatures, those-including appellate judges-who are
crafting new statutes, court rules, and procedures to give effect
to Atkins should strive to create definitions and to implement
processes broad enough to last through changing definitions.
44. DSM-IV-TR, supra n, 9, at 41.
45. James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, in
Symposium on the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
414,475 (1985).
46. DSM-IV.TR, supra n. 9, at 41.
47. Mental Retardation, supra n. 8, at 80.
48. See Moore v. Tex., 535 U.S. 1044 (2002) (Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting from grant of stay of execution) (indicating that petitioner had IQ scores of 68
and 76); Perkins v. Ala., 536 U.S. 953 (2002), on remand, Exparte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453
(Ala. 2002) (indicating that petitioner had an IQ score of 76).
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III. SPECIAL AREAS OF INTEREST FOR APPELLATE COURTS AND
APPELLATE LAWYERS
A. Adaptive Functioning
A key factor in Atkins was the component of adaptive
functioning-that while mentally retarded persons "frequently
know the difference between right and wrong and are competent
to stand trial," because of their impairments,
by definition they have diminished capacities to understand
and process information, to communicate, to abstract from
mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical
reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the
reactions of others.49
While not warranting an exemption from criminal sanctions, the
Court found that these deficiencies do "diminish [mentally
retarded persons'] personal culpability." 50 As one team of
experts observes,
[I]t is people who have mild mental retardation that is,
those who are able to function with the least assistance,
who present the greatest obstacle to lawyers, the criminal
justice system, and even their own defense."
Given these factors, both lawyers and appellate courts must seek
a thorough understanding of how well a capital defendant has
been functioning in his environment.
Mental retardation's adaptive functioning component, that
is, a person's skills in the practical aspects of everyday living-
communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal
skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional
academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety-is one of the
tricky areas in the application of Atkins. Two frequently used
scales for measuring adaptive behavior are the AAMR's
Adaptive Behavior Scale and the Vineland Adaptive Behavior
Scales.
49. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
50. Id.
51. Denis W. Keyes, William J. Edwards & Timothy J. Derning, Mitigating Mental
Retardation in Capital Cases: Finding the "Invisible" Defendant, 22 Mental & Physical
Disability L. Rev. 529, 530 (1998) [hereinafter Invisible Defendant].
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The AAMR points out that an assessment of adaptive
functioning "must be considered within the context of
community environments typical of the individual's age peers
and culture."5 2 As the Supreme Court has noted, people with
mental retardation "have a reduced ability to cope with and
function in the everyday world."53 Capital murder defendants
suspected to have mental retardation, like the members of the
general population who may have mental retardation, are likely
to be within the highest-functioning level of persons with mental
retardation, because eighty-five percent of those with mental
retardation have IQs in the range of 55 to 75.54 These persons are
the least likely to have any physical attributes or any outward
manifestation that would indicate a developmental disability."
Intellectually, most in the legal profession would avow an
understanding that persons with mental retardation can be
otherwise capable persons who cannot function in many life-
skill areas. However, some early Atkins decisions indicate a
disconnect between our intellectual knowledge and our
application of those understandings to cases involving capital
defendants. Some state appellate courts have denied findings of
mental retardation without further hearings, on the basis of
evidence that defendants had obtained GEDs,56 maintained
employment, 7 or were married or had romantic relationships."
The psychological community rejects as too simplistic any
analysis that would discount mental retardation because a person
had obtained some life skills. A leader in the field of intelligence
testing noted in 1905 that persons with mental retardation have
"certain aptitudes" such as
good auditory or musical memory, and a whole repertoire
of songs; others have mechanical ability. If all were
52. Mental Retardation, supra n. 8, at 8.
53. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985).
54. DSM-IV-TR, supra n, 9, at 43.
55. See Invisible Defendant, supra n. 51, at 530.
56. Emmett v. Commonwealth, 569 S.E.2d 39, 47 (Va. 2002); Morrisette v.
Commonwealth, 569 S.E.2d 47, 56 n. 8 (Va. 2002).
57. Emmett, 569 S.E.2d at 47 (Va. 2002); Ex Parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453, 456 (Ala.
2002).
58. Perkins, 851 So. 2d at 456.
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carefully examined, many examnples of these partial
aptitudes would probably be found.
Advocates for persons with mental retardation have been
presenting persuasive evidence for decades that, with support,
persons with mental retardation can and do function with
success in areas of everyday living. In fact, a core assumption of
the understanding of mental retardation is that "[w]ithin an
individual, limitations often coexist with strengths."6 o The DSM-
IV-TR also notes that person with "mild" mental retardation
"may, with appropriate training and opportunities, develop good
adaptive skills in other domains.",6' This is something that
fiction writers seem to understand. Literature does not present
persons with mental retardation as incapable of action or
emotions. Like characters in John Steinbeck's Of Mice and Men
and Daniel Keyes's Flowers for Algernon, persons with mental
retardation have relationships and jobs that they can perform
within their limitations.
Appellate courts and appellate lawyers faced with capital
defendants who may have mental retardation must keep in mind,
then, that just as with any living skills, the appearance of a
particular person's ability to function in a life-skill area does not
necessarily mean that he or she has complete command of that
skill or has mastered the necessary related skills. Persons with
mental retardation have been observed to attempt to obscure
their condition behind a "mask," 62 to present to others as more
capable than they may be. "Masking" can be an understandable
response to a sometimes dangerous and exploitative world in
environments where there are few supports for persons with
61
mental retardation. One group of experts explains that
[i]t is rarely considered by lawyers and judges that people
with mental retardation will attempt to hide their disability.
Defendants who have mental retardation often are
59. Alfred Binet, New Methods for the Diagnosis of the Intellectual Level of
Subnormals, in The Development of Intelligence in Children (Elizabeth S. Kite trans.,
Publications of the Training Sch. of Vineland) (reprinting material first published in
L'Annge Psychologique 12, 191-244 (Presses Universitaire de France 1905)).
60. Mental Retardation, supra n. 8, at 1.
61. DSM-IV-TR, supra n. 9, at 47.
62. See Invisible Defendant, supra n. 51, at 530; Ellis & Luckasson, supra n. 45, at
430-31.
63. See Invisible Defendant, supra n. 51, at 530.
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characterized as quiet and cooperative. By attempting to
"look like" persons of average ability, they are masking
their disabilities because of the associated stigma of
retardation. This "cloak of competence," similar to the
concept of "passing" is best done by keeping a low profile,
not drawing attention to oneself, and agreeing with those
asking the questions. As a result, people with mild mental
retardation rarely are suspected of, evaluated for, or
identified as having severe deficits and mental retardation.
This ironic twist is called "cheating to lose" because the
defendant with mental retardation deflects attention from
his or her disabilities rather than bringing them to the
attention of his or her lawyer or the 
court." 6
However, masking creates an added responsibility for judges
and attorneys to look beyond first appearances of a defendant's
expressions or conduct if there is an indication that mental
retardation may be present.
One common label that appellate judges and appellate
lawyers should be wary of is "streetwise" or "street-smart" as
used in a clinical evaluation of mental retardation that appears in
a trial transcript. "Street-smart" and "streetwise" are used
casually in ordinary language, but clinical psychological
literature seems to ascribe no meaning to these concepts,
probably because they are untestable and ultimately unhelpful to
a full understanding of an individual's intelligence and real-
world capabilities. Opinions about a person's abilities based on a
report of about his or her "street-smarts" (such as a witness's
expressed belief that people who sell drugs cannot be retarded),"
should be tested with an eye toward how the person was actually
operating in his or her environment. For example, questions
about whether the person followed a routine or whether the
activities that the person was involved in actually required
complicated analysis and decisionmaking would be appropriate.
64. Id. (internal citations omitted).
65. See Ex parte Smith, 2003 WL 1145475 at *10 (Ala. Mar. 13, 2003) (denying Atkins
remand because defendant's IQ score was 72 and he did not meet the adaptive behavior
component for mental retardation: "Smith was involved in an interstate illegal-drug
enterprise. Smith testified that at the time of the murders he was under stress because he
owed a Jamaican drug supplier in Jacksonville, Florida, $27,000. Smith admitted that at the
time of the murders he was addicted to cocaine and that he was using $400.00 worth of
crack cocaine per day; he said that in order to maintain that habit he 'distributed' drugs." )
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Because few judges, court personnel, lawmakers, or
lawyers have any background in mental retardation evaluations
or testing protocols (and indeed, relatively few psychologists
and psychiatrists have extensive training in the detection of
mental retardation"), appellate courts should make use of
experts on developmental disabilities and testing. Common
knowledge about mental retardation should be considered no
more authoritative than lay understanding of any scientific issue,
such as DNA evidence or pathologists' findings. Grave mistakes
could be made if appellate courts base determinations about
mental retardation on intuitive feelings about mental retardation
or the ways in which people with mental retardation should act.
Just as with any scientific, medical, or psychological inquiry,
horse sense cannot substitute for clinical judgments by
appropriately qualified and experienced experts in mental
retardation.
B. Malingering
Justice Scalia expressed in Atkins a concern that the
decision would result in an onslaught of capital defendants
faking mental retardation, or as he put it, "malingering,"
because he believes that the "symptoms of this condition can
readily be feigned., 67 At least one state court has reacted to
concerns about malingering by ordering capital defendants to
take personality tests along with intelligence tests to determine
66. The research shows, in fact, that
[b]ecause mental retardation represents approximately 2 percent to 3 percent of
the population, it is a small, specific subspecialty for mental health
professionals. Typically, these professionals have little experience and training
with people who have mental retardation. The assessment, diagnosis and
treatment of this population is sometimes very different than the "typical"
patient. Training in traditional mental health graduate programs includes little, if
any, information about mental retardation.
Invisible Defendant, supra n. 51, at 535. Indeed,
mental retardation differs sufficiently from other forms of mental disability that
training in mental illness cannot, without more, qualify a physician to provide
useful information about a mentally retarded person .... The Mental Health
Standards recognize that the field of mental retardation requires particular
training and experience and that relatively few professionals have expertise in
both mental illness and mental retardation.
Ellis & Luckasson, supra n. 45, at 487.
67. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., & Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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mental retardation, 6 despite the fact that personality tests "have
warnings that they should not be administered to individuals
who are mentally disabled or who have not successfully
completed at least six years of schooling."6 9
Although malingering has been a concern in forensic
evaluation of mental illness, ° it is not likely to be a problem in
mental-retardation assessments. It is unlikely that a defendant
can successfully fake having mental retardation because,,the
condition's components provide a check against malingering.
Evidence of mental retardation must be present before the onset
age, which is 18 in most definitions. In other words, mental
retardation must emerge at an age long before even the most
cynical observer could say a defendant had reason to pretend to
have mental retardation. As Jim Ellis, a leading author in the
field of developmental disability and the law has pointed out,
any concerns that an individual could somehow manage to
feign cognitive impairment, undetected by clinical
evaluators, should be dispelled by the fact that such
deception would have had to begin during the individual's
childhood. There are no reports in the clinical literature
indicating that this is a practical problem in the assessment
of individuals who are thought to have mental retardation.7'
Additionally, the composition and sequence of questions and
tasks given during IQ tests make them resistant to attempts to
malinger.72 The defendant's intellectual capability and adaptive
68. In Russell v. State, 849 So. 2d 95 (Miss. 2003), the Mississippi Supreme Court
remanded a case for an Atkins determination and further ruled that "the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-Il (MMPI-1I) is to be administered since its associated
validity scales make the test best suited to detect malingering." Id. at 148.
69. The MMPI, for example, has some 566 items that must be read to or by the
defendant, which can become incredibly tedious.
70. See e.g. Drope v. Mo., 420 U.S. 162, 181 n. 16 (1975) (noting in a case involving a
mentally ill defendant who apparently attempted suicide that "a self-inflicted wound near
vital organs does not suggest malingering"); Stewart v. U.S., 366 U.S. I, 24 (1961) (Clark
& Whittaker, JJ., dissenting) (pointing out that a defendant who sometimes "acted normal"
could have been "feigning mental illness" just before his trial).
71. James W. Ellis, Special Feature: Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A
Guide to State Legislative Issues, 27 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. I1, 14 (Jan./Feb.
2003).
72. See e.g. U.S. v. Stevenson, 135 F. Supp. 2d 878, 881 n. 2 (N.D. II. 2001) ("It is
possible to test for malingering by noticing deviations from expected responses by people
who actually have certain mental defects."); State v. Raiford, 846 So. 2d 913, 917-18 (La.
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functioning throughout his life must be carefully examined by
experts, again, including periods when the defendant had no
motivation to pretend to have mental retardation.
C. Test Accuracy: The Flynn Effect and the Practice Effect
Appellate courts should be aware that scores on IQ tests
have been rising with every passing decade.73 This phenomenon
is called the "Flynn Effect," after James Flynn, a psychologist
who studied IQ testing in twenty (largely Western) countries.74
Flynn's research showed IQ test scores rose from nine to twenty
points across nations and cultures over a thirty year period; IQ
scores for Americans rose over thirteen points in forty-six
years." As of yet, no definitive explanation for the Flynn Effect
has been discovered, although Flynn continues to study the
issue.76 An appellate court considering an Atkins claim might
thus need to ask questions about when the relevant intelligence
tests were last re-normed when older IQ test scores are
compared in a particular case to more recent scores.77
Appellate courts should also be aware that when a person is
given the same or an equivalent IQ test in a short span of time,
higher scores may be achieved on the later tests, but those
increased scores do not reflect improved intelligence or even
greater effort. This situation is called "practice effect," which
refers to "gains in scores on cognitive tests that occur when a
App. 4th Cir. 2003) (documenting different tests that psychologist used during evaluation
to ensure that responses were consistent with ability shown).
73. See e.g. Marguerite Holloway, Flynn's Effect (available at http://www.sciam.com
/article.cfm?articlelD=00037F65-D9CO-IC6A-84A9809EC588Ef2I&catlD=2) (profile of
Flynn first published in Scientific American magazine of January 1999) (accessed Nov. 25,
2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Kristen Leutwyler, New Model Solves IQ Paradox (available at http://www.
sciam.com/article.cfm?articlelD=0004E175-930C- 1C5E-B882809EC588ED9F&catlD=l)
(report of Flynn's recent research first published in Scientific American magazine of April
2001) (accessed Nov. 25, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process).
77. Renorming is the process by which test scores obtained from a sample set of people
taking the same test are plotted on a bell curve in order to determine average scores.
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person is re-tested on the same instrument, or tested more than
once on very similar ones."" One observer notes that
[t]hese gains are due to the experience of having taken the
test previously; they occur without the examinee being
given specific or general feedback on test items, and they
do not reflect growth or other improvement on the skills
being assessed."79
In a situation in which a defendant is given multiple tests within
a short interval and appears to perform better on the later tests,
courts and lawyers should consider whether the practice effect
may be affecting the later scores.
D. Cultural Bias and Testing Subjectivity
The scales that are the foundation of contemporary IQ tests
did not originally include non-whites as test subjects. African
Americans, for example, were not represented in numbers
proportionate to their presence in the population until well into
the 1970s. ° And although efforts were made to balance the
scoring on the tests when it was discovered that some questions
produced different answers based on gender, relatively little
effort was made until the 1970s and 1980s to re-norm IQ tests
when non-whites routinely gave different answers to specific
questions than did whites.8'
Some argue that the intelligence tests have not fully
outgrown their more exclusionary origins 82 and that test
78. Alan S. Kaufman, Practice Effects, in Psychological Forum (available at http://
www.psychologicalforum.com/articles/aug03.asp) (reprinting text from 2 Encyclopedia of
Human Intelligence 828-33 (Robert J. Sternberg, ed., Macmillan Publg. Co. 1994))
(accessed Nov. 25, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
79. Id.
80. Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp. 926, 957 (N.D. Calif. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984).
81. Id.
82. Henry Goddard, Lewis Terman, and David Wechsler, among the pioneers of
intelligence testing, all subscribed to then-socially acceptable belief that non-whites, and
indeed, all non-Anglo-Saxons, were genetically inferior to Anglo-Saxon whites. See e.g.
Larry P., 495 F. Supp. at 936 (quoting Lewis Terman, The Measurement of Intelligence 91
(Houghton Mifflin Co. 1916) (declaring that borderline feebleminded represented "the
level of intelligence which is very, very common among Spanish-Indian and Mexican
families of the South-west and also among negroes," and that "[t]heir dullness seems to be
racial or at least inherent in the family stocks from which they come" )).
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designers have not sufficiently scrutinized IQ tests for aspects of
cultural bias.83 For example, one question on a version of the
Stanford-Binet that was being administered in the 1980s
assumed that there were native Americans in the United States
unfamiliar with bicycles:
An Indian who had come to town for the first time in his
life saw a boy riding along the street. As the boy rode by,
the Indian said, "The white boy is lazy; he walks sitting
down." What was the boy riding on that caused the Indian
to say "he walks sitting down? '
4
One judge observed in a 1979 case that
[c]ultural differences can also be found in specific test
items. Some of these items have in fact become rather
notorious, such as the "fight item" on WISC tests. This
question asked children what they would do if struck by a
smaller child of the same sex. The "correct" answer is that
it is wrong to strike the child back.... Young black
children aged six and seven "missed" this item more than
twice as often as their white counterparts .... The
difference can only be attributed to a cultural variation at
that age. Similarly, it may be that such questions as who
wrote Romeo and Juliet, who discovered America, and who
invented the light bulb, are culturally biased.85
An example of a right answer being in the eye of the
beholder is a question on the WAIS-R for Children. The second
item given in the vocabulary section is for the child to define
"umbrella." In one case, the test scoring system was explained
this way:
83. Most IQ tests were not normed with non-white populations. See Larry P., 495 F.
Supp. at 957 (quoting David Wechsler, The Measurement of Intelligence 107 (Williams &
Wilkins Co. 1944) (concluding that the WAIS was not valid for "the colored population of
the United States" and acknowledging that "we have eliminated the colored vs. white
factor by admitting at the outset that our norms cannot be used for the colored population
of the United States" )).
84. Parents in Action on Spec. Educ. (PASE) v. Hannon, 506 F. Supp. 831, 869 (N.D.
11. 1980) (finding standard intelligence tests administered by the Chicago Board of
Education not to be, in the main, culturally biased against black children).
85. Larry P., 495 F. Supp. at 958 (internal citations omitted). According to the tester's
guide, acceptable answers for the question "Who discovered America?" are
"Columbus... Leif Erickson, Vikings (Norsemen), Amerigo Vespucci. (If a child says
'Indians,' say 'yes, the Indians were already there, but who sailed across the ocean and
discovered America?')." PASE, 506 F. Supp. at 838.
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Two-point responses are: "Use it to keep the rain off...
protects you when it rains.., put it over your head when it
rains.., so you don't get wet when it rains." One-point
responses are: "Carry it when it rains ... big round thing
that can fold up ... put it over your head.., to keep off the
sun... you hold it up (gives appropriate demonstration)...
helps you if it starts raining.., keeps you dry. All of these
one-point responses are marked with "Q" in the manual,
indicating that the examiner should follow up the response
with another question as to what the child means. If a child
says, "Put it over your head," the examiner should ask,
"Explain what you mean." If the child says something like,
"You know, like when it rains," he is given two points for
the response." 86
The inherent bias in this scoring system is obvious: If a child
responds that umbrellas are used to keep off the sun, that child
may get only a one-point score for that apparently partial answer
in Seattle, while in Alabama, that answer might be considered
perfectly acceptable and credited for two points, since some
people in Alabama carry umbrellas to deflect the sun's rays.
Although test designers assure that some of the more outdated
and culturally suspect questions have been eliminated from the
latest versions of intelligence tests, it cannot be forgotten that IQ
tests remain highly subjective evaluations of achievement.
E. The Checkered Past of IQ Testing in the United States
Appellate courts and lawyers who rely on test scores as
indications of mental retardation should be aware that they may
be placing their faith in the results of mental-retardation
measurements that were never intended to be used in a legal
context. The tests themselves were designed only to be academic
screening devices but were later used for what by contemporary
standards would be considered pernicious purposes. A very brief
look back at the history of IQ testing reveals the complicated
ground upon which appellate courts that rely on test results as
indicia of mental retardation are basing their life-and-death
decisions.
86. PASE, 506 F. Supp. at 844.
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1. European Beginnings: The Binet Scale
While humans have contemplated methods of determining
intellect since the beginning of recorded history, French
psychologist Alfred Binet is regarded as a pioneer of modem
intelligence testing. In 1904, Binet, the director of the
psychology laboratory at the Sorbonne who was also trained as a
lawyer, was asked by the French minister of education to devise
a method to direct special education services to schoolchildren
who were performing poorly in the public schools. Binet saw his
task as quantifying "basic processes of reasoning" and
"everyday tasks" rather than learned intelligence, or, in other
words, he sought to measure a child's potential, rather than how
much classroom information the child had retained. Binet
developed an intelligence test with a collaborator that became
known as the Binet-Simon Scale, and which, in a revised
version, is still widely used.
In 1905, Binet began administering the scale to Parisian
schoolchildren. The Binet-Simon Scale had thirty tasks,
beginning from the most simple, such as having a child follow a
lit match with her eyes, to more difficult tasks of copying
patterns, naming objects, having the child form sentences from
provided words, repeating phrases and figures in sequence and
answering questions such as "My neighbor has been receiving
strange visitors. He has received in turn a doctor, a lawyer, and
then a priest. What is taking place?" '87 Standards were created
based on the children's performance. "For example, if 70
percent of 8-year-olds could pass a particular test, then success
on the test represented the 8-year-old level of intelligence."88
Binet was very concerned about the test being misused,
writing that he was concerned about the authorities rationalizing
their use of the test as an "'excellent opportunity for getting rid
of all the children who trouble us,' and without the true critical
spirit, they designate all who are unruly, or disinterested in the
87. J. A. Plucker, Human intelligence: Historical Influences, Current Controversies,
Teaching Resources (2003) (available at http://www.indiana.edu/-intell.binet.shtml)
(accessed Nov. 26, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
88. PBS Online, A Science Odyssey: People and Discoveries: Binet Pioneers
Intelligence Testing (WGBH 1998) (available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aso/databank
/entries/dh05te.html) (accessed Nov. 26, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate
Practice and Process).
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school."8 9 As his test came into wider use, particularly in the
United States, Binet's fears were to be realized.
2. Early IQ Testing in the United States
Discussing the history of mental retardation in the
nineteenth century, Justice Marshall once characterized the
treatment of persons with mental retardation as "grotesque." 90
He observed that
a regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation
soon emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and
indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow. Massive
custodial institutions were built to warehouse the retarded
for life; the aim was to halt reproduction of the retarded and
"nearly extinguish their race." Retarded children were
categorically excluded from public schools, based on the
false stereotype that all were ineducable and on the
purported need to protect nonretarded children from them.
State laws deemed the retarded "unfit for citizenship." 9
Early IQ testing in America was to be used to support the goals
of Social Darwinism-the belief that persons with mental
retardation had to be identified and segregated from society. 92
a. Goddard and Ellis Island
In 1908, an American psychologist, Henry H. Goddard,
then the director of the Vineland Training School in New Jersey,
translated the Binet-Simon Scale into English and headed a
89. Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man 181 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1996).
90. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
91. Id. at 461-63 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal
citations omitted).
92. Id. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One author
defined Social Darwinism as
a general term for any evolutionary argument about the biological basis of
human differences, but the initial nineteenth-century meaning referred to a
specific theory of class stratification within industrial societies, and particularly
to the idea that there was a permanently poor underclass consisting of
genetically inferior people who had precipitated down into their inevitable fate.
Stephen Jay Gould, Curveball, in New Yorker 139, 139 (Nov. 28, 1994) (reviewing
Richard J. Herrnstein & Charles Murray, The Bell Curve (Free Press 1994)).
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wave of efforts using intelligence testing for social purposes.93 A
supporter of the theory that "feeblemindedness" was due to
heredity, Goddard proposed isolating persons with mental
retardation from society so that they would not have children.
He also declared that mentally retarded people constituted a
"menace to society and civilization.., responsible in a large
degree for many, if not all, of our social problems." 9 4 In support
of his theory, Goddard authored a highly influential study about
a young woman residing at Vineland and the incidence of
mental retardation in her family.95 The popularity of his studies
of persons with mental retardation led to an invitation from the
Commission of Immigration at Ellis Island for Goddard to
develop testing procedures to identify immigrants who had
mental retardation. Before Goddard's involvement, immigration
officers rejected immigrants they suspected of being "mentally
defective" on the basis of visual inspections, a notion that
Goddard had partially repudiated in The Kallikak Family.
96
Goddard began his assignment by carrying out a study of
immigrants in public institutions.97 His first conclusion was that
the then-prevailing public opinion that majority of immigrants
were mentally retarded was "grossly overestimated."98
Even at this early stage of mental-retardation testing,
practitioners were "acutely aware of the political implications of
93. John T.E. Richardson, Howard Andrew Knox and the Origins of Performance
Testing on Ellis Island, in History of Psychology vol. 6, 143, 147-48 (Educ. Pblg. Found.
2003).
94. Ellis & Luckasson, supra n. 45, at 418.
95. Henry H. Goddard, The Kallikak Family: A Study in the Heredity of Feeble-
Mindedness (Macmillan Co. 1927). Decades later, researchers alleged that the young
woman who was the source of the study was in fact learning-disabled, not retarded, and
further alleged that her reported family history was altered to support Goddard's
conclusions. See Kwame Dakwa, Amber Esping & Jonathan Plucker, The Kallikak Family
in Human Intelligence: Historical Influences, Current Controversies, Teaching Resources
(available at http://www.indiana.edu/-intell/kallikak.shtml) (accessed Nov. 26, 2003; copy
on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
96. Richardson, supra n. 93, at 150, 156. As Goddard wrote,
A large proportion of those who are considered feeble-minded in this study are
persons who would not be recognized as such by the untrained observer. They
are not the imbeciles nor idiots who plainly show in their countenances the
extent of their mental defect.
Goddard, supra n. 95, at 104.
97. Richardson, supra n. 93, at 148.
98. Id.
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their work,"99 concerns that echo in current applications of
Atkins. One of Goddard's contemporaries worried that the IQ
tests administered to the immigrants, in addition to being limited
to those who spoke English, were also culturally inappropriate:
To the uninitiated using routine tests for defectives nearly
all the peasants from certain European countries appear to
be of the moron type; but of course this a fallacy. If these
peasants are questioned about conditions existing in the
land from which they come most of them will show
average intelligence.'00
Notwithstanding these cautions, Goddard applied IQ testing
to immigrants arriving at Ellis Island, but only to those who
were arriving in steerage; first and second class passengers were
interviewed privately in their cabins. Goddard found that over
eighty percent of the Russian, Hungarian, and Jewish
immigrants tested at Ellis Island were mentally retarded.' °'
Thousands of immigrants were refused entrance to the United
States because of recommendations based on their IQ scores.
In a journal article summarizing his findings at Ellis Island,
Goddard expressed surprise at the immigrants' low scores, but
his expectations can be amusing by contemporary standards.
Reflecting on. the inaccurate answers when immigrants were
asked to tell the examiners the date, Goddard wrote,
What shall we say of his ignorance of the date? This does
not mean the exact date, since a leeway of a few days is
always allowed. Must we again conclude that the European
peasant of the type that immigrates to America pays no
attention to the passage of time? That the drudgery of life is
so severe that he cares not whether it is January or July,
whether it is 1912 or 1906? Is it possible that the person
may be of considerable intelligence and yet, because of the
peculiarity of his environment, not have acquired this
ordinary bit of knowledge, even though the calendar is not
in general use on the continent, or is somewhat complicated
99. Id. at 149.
100. Howard Andrew Knox, The Moron and the Study of Alien Defectives, 60 J. Am.
Med. Assn. 105, 105 (Jan. 1913).
101. Leon Kamin, The Science and Politics of IQ 16 (Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. 1974).
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as in Russia? If so what an environment it must have
been!'02
Of course, viewed by contemporary standards, it seems
reasonable that a person traveling from Russia in the early 1900s
would have been traveling for such a long time, and for such a
long distance, much of it in third-class accommodations at sea,
that he or she might not know what month or even what year it
was immediately upon arriving at Ellis Island.
In 1912, a German psychologist, while studying student
scores on the Binet-Simon Scale, found that the "intellectual
level" of the children corresponded to their chronological age.
That psychologist, Wilhelm Stem, reformed the Binet-Simon
Scale's "intellectual level" measurement by dividing the child's
chronological age by the age at which the child reached her
maximum achievement; the formula he used was IQ = mental
age/chronological age x 100. The resulting number was the
mean IQ score, sometimes also referred to as a ratio IQ
measurement. Lewis Terman of Stanford adopted Stem's
measurement system and named this ratio "intelligence
quotient," which was the origin of the term "IQ" that is used
today. In 1916, Terman also published a revised Binet-Simon
scale re-normed for American populations. This "Stanford
Revision of the Binet-Simon Scale," soon became known as the
"Stanford-Binet" intelligence test that, with modem additions
and revisions, is still in use today.
b. Testing of Recruits in World War I
World War I provided the impetus for the next
groundbreaking event in the history of intelligence testing in the
United States. Faced with assessing the abilities of thousands of
new recruits, the army sought a way to classify soldiers
according to their intellectual abilities. The then-president of the
APA, Robert Yerkes, was asked to assemble a committee to
devise an intelligence test that the army could administer to
102. Henry Goddard, Mental Tests and the Immigrant, 2 J. Delinquency 243 (Sept.
1917) (available at http://www.arthurhu.com/99/09goddard.htm) (accessed Dec. 19, 2003;
copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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groups of new servicemen in an hour or less.'°3 Yerkes and his
team, relying on scales developed by experts such as Arthur
Otis, created two scales, an "Alpha" scale for literate, English-
speaking recruits and a "Beta" scale for those soldiers who were
illiterate or non-English speakers.'°4 Army records estimate that,
from 1917 to 1919, the Alpha and Beta examinations were
administered to 1,726,966 recruits. '°5 In a reminder of Henry
Goddard's Ellis Island tests, Yerkes's army-screening test
proved to be highly influential to legislators seeking to establish
quotas on the number of immigrants entering the United States.
The quotas eventually barred six million European refugees
from entering the country between 1924 and the outbreak of
World War II. One author later theorized that this effort to
reduce immigration may have prevented many of these refugees
from escaping the Holocaust: "We know what happened to
many who wished to leave but had nowhere to go. The paths to
destruction are indirect, but ideas can be agents as sure as guns
and bombs." 106 The army tests, today referred to as the Otis
Alpha/Beta scales, are now viewed with some disfavor, 7 but
appellate courts should be aware that they are still sometimes
used to assess prisoners.
During World War I, a psychological examiner named
David Wechsler became convinced that the IQ tests then in use
did not truly reflect the abilities of the soldiers to whom he
administered the tests. He later recalled the case of a "a native,
white, Oklahoman" who was tested at a mental age of eight on a
Stanford-Binet scale, but who "before entering the Army... had
gotten along very well, was supporting a family, [and] had been
103. Corwin Boake, Fron the Binet-Sinon to the Wechsler-Bellevue: Tracing the




106. Gould, supra n. 89, at 263. Yerkes's protegd, Carl C. Brigham, whose work helped
pass the 1924 [Immigration] Restriction Act that led to the quotas, was later to be well-
known himself as the secretary of the College Entrance Examination Board, where he
designed the first S.A.T.
107. See Invisible Defendant, supra n. 5 1, at 536 (noting that tests administered in group
settings are not appropriate for individualized mental-retardation evaluations).
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working as a skilled-oil driller for several years." 108 Wechsler
observed that the Oklahoman he tested
systematically rates as a mental defective on mental tests,
but, who can in no way be judged as such, when diagnosed
on the basis of concrete social standards, i.e., in terms of
capacity to adjust to the normal demands of his social and
economic environment.' °9
After the war, Wechsler worked at New York's Bellevue
Psychiatric Hospital. While at Bellevue, he became convinced
that the IQ tests then in use were inappropriate for adults
because the ratio IQ measurement (calculated by using the
formula IQ = mental age/chronological age x 100) was not
applicable to adults, who were past the developmental stage and
therefore, were not as easily compared with other adults as
children can be compared with each other."0 Wechsler also
believed that some IQ tests relied too heavily on verbal scales
and that low IQ measurements were more attributable to literacy
levels than to actual intelligence."'
Wechsler designed the Wechsler-Bellevue Scale to address
these concerns. The Wechsler-Bellevue, published in 1939, was
an instrument with sub-tests to measure both verbal and
nonverbal (performance) abilities that borrowed from many
other tests, such as the army's Alpha test."2 He adopted a mean
score of 100, following the Stanford-Binet metric, but replaced
the ratio IQ with a deviation score. The deviation score
determined how far above or below the mean (or point of
average intelligence) the person tested was, and this
measurement method is used today, with results expressed in
"standard deviations from the mean." In 1949, Wechsler
produced the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC),
and in 1955, he produced a revision of the adult scales named
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS). Revised versions
of both tests are used today, currently known as the WISC-III
108. Boake, supra n. 103, at 394.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 396.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 397.
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and the WAIS-III. The WAIS-III is in fact the test of adult
intelligence most widely used in clinical settings. ' 3
c. Supreme Court Approval of IQ Testing: Buck v. Bell
In 1927, the Supreme Court indirectly affirmed the use of
widespread IQ testing for social purposes in Buck v. Bell,"4 a
case challenging a Virginia law mandating sterilization of
persons with mental retardation. The petitioner, a young mother
with a child of an allegedly feeble mind, was sterilized under the
law after scoring a mental age of nine on the Stanford-Binet.
Carrie Buck's mother, then fifty-two, had tested at a mental age
of seven."5 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., delivered the Court's
decision upholding the Virginia sterilization law, declaring,
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may
call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be
strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the
strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt
to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being
swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind. Three generations of imbeciles are enough." 6
Buck v. Bell opened the door to Virginia's forcible sterilization
of 8,500 persons at institutions like the one where Carrie Buck
was housed; the practice was stopped in the 1970s, although
legislators did not call for repeal of the law until the 1980s."7
In an ironic postscript to Buck v. Bell, in the 1980s, the
director of the institution where Carrie Buck was sterilized
investigated her family history. The director discovered that she
113. Gordon E. Taub, A Confirmatory Analysis of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale-Third Edition: Is the Verbal/Performance Discrepancy Justified? in Prac.
Assessment, Research & Evaluation 7(22) (2001) (available at http://pareonline.net/getvn
.asp?v=7&n=22) (accessed Nov. 26, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice
and Process).
114. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
115. Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter: A Popular, Quasi-Scientific Idea Can
Be a Powerful Tool for Injustice, in Natural History 12, 14 (July/Aug. 2002).
116. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
117. Robert Reinhold, Virginia Hospital's Chief Traces 50 Years of Sterilizing the
"Retarded," 129 New York Times 6 (Feb. 23, 1980).
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was apparently sent to an institution for the mentally retarded
because she had been impregnated as a result of a rape and
needed to go away to have the baby; the institution at which she
ended up was the only place where there was room for her."'
The director also discovered school records revealing that her
child was considered bright and regarded as an adequate
student. 1'
F. The Legacy of IQ Testing:
Questions for Today's Appellate Courts
Fresh controversies that relate back to the origins of the
tests have evolved in recent years. For decades, black children
have been disproportionately represented in classes for mildly
retarded students.'2° One example was the Chicago school
system: In the 1978-79 school year, 13,225 children were
enrolled in special education classes. Of these, 10,833, or
eighty-two per cent, were black. In contrast, of the 106,581
white children enrolled in the system, only 1,404 were attending
special education classes.' 21 In California, black children
represented ten percent of the student population in 1975, but
made up twenty-five percent of the population enrolled in
special-education classes.' 22 Parents of black children nationwide
sued their school systems, charging that the intelligence tests
used to classify students were racially discriminatory.
In 1971, a school-aged plaintiff sued the San Francisco
schools on behalf of a group of African-American children. He
charged that the placement of black pupils in special programs
for the "mildly retarded" was discriminatory and violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, because discriminatory intelligence
tests had been used to classify them as retarded. The use of such
tests to assign minority children to special-education classes was
118. Gould, supra n. 115, at 16.
119. Reinhold, supra n. 118.
120. William G. Buss, Intelligence Testing and Judicial Policy Making for Special
Education, in 2 Psychology, Pub. Policy, & L. 584, 584 (Sept./Dec. 1996).
121. PASE, 506 F. Supp. at 833 (finding that standard intelligence tests administered by
the Chicago Board of Education were not, in the main, culturally biased against black
children).
122. Larry P., 495 F. Supp. at 931.
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immediately prohibited by a federal court's injunction that
prohibited the schools
from utilizing, permitting the use of, or approving the use
of any standardized intelligence tests ... for the
identification of black E.M.R. [educable mentally retarded]
children or their placement into EMR classes, without
securing prior approval by this court.'23
That decision was modified later by the Ninth Circuit, which
affirmed only on the grounds brought under federal statutory
law.
124
In 1980, the PASE suit was filed in Chicago, and although
the plaintiffs relied on the same legal arguments and experts
used in the California case, the court discounted much of the
expert testimony presented and examined the intelligence tests
for itself. Its opinion lists all of the items and answers for three
widely used tests, and the court eventually held
that the WISC, WISC-R, and Stanford-Binet tests, when
used in conjunction with the statutorily mandated "other
criteria for determining an appropriate educational program
for a child" ... do not discriminate against black children
125in the Chicago public schools.
The different conclusions in these two cases may be traced
back to the way in which the appellate courts involved viewed
the effect of the test designers' known belief "that low test
performance by Black test takers resulted from the genetic
inferiority of Black people." 126 The California court focused on
this "historical strain of racist beliefs," 127 and found that in the
absence of any other acceptable explanation for the disparity of
test results between white and black children, the tests were
culturally biased. The PASE court, on the other hand, discounted
the significance of the history of the IQ tests because no attempt
was made by the plaintiffs to connect these beliefs with the tests
at issue. Instead, the PASE court held that it was the plaintiffs'
burden to show that cultural bias was present in the test items
themselves, a burden that the court found they did not meet.
123. Larry P., 495 F. Supp. at 989.
124. Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984).
125. PASE, 506 F. Supp. at 883.
126. Buss, supra n. 120, at 595.
127. ld.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Viewed in light of the history of IQ testing in the United
States, Atkins poses a significant challenge to the appellate
courts. When called upon to evaluate the sentences of capital
defendants who may suffer from mental retardation, they must
ensure that experts who are specialists in mental retardation
examine and evaluate those defendants. Equally important, they
must resist the temptation to seek easy answers from IQ tests;
history demonstrates that those tests are not designed to provide
the sorts of assessments critical in the life-or-death
circumstances of capital litigation. a
It will also be important for appellate courts-and the
lawyers who practice before them-to stay abreast of
developments in this area of the law. The Supreme Court's
decision in Atkins came less than fifteen years after its earlier
decision in Penry v. Lynaugh,'28 which indicated that capital
defendants with mental retardation could in fact be executed.
This relatively rapid turn-around suggests that the law affecting
the punishments appropriate for defendants with mental
retardation will continue to evolve. The lawyers and judges
responsible for capital appeals and post-conviction proceedings
cannot afford to miss the inevitable developments as they occur.
128. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).

